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Robinson v. Kroger: A Leveling of the Field
or Fatal Fall for Summary Judgment?

In Robinson v.Kroger,' the Supreme Court of Georgia reaffirmed that
an invitee can recover in a slip-and-fall action when (1) the owner/occupier had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2)
plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary
care. However, in a drastic departure from existing case law, the court
held that the evidentiary burden regarding plaintiff's knowledge of the
hazard and exercise of reasonable care does not shift, for the purpose of
summary judgment, until the defendant establishes negligence on the
part of the plaintiff.2
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Henrietta Robinson injured her knee when she slipped and fell on a
green substance while walking through the produce section of a store
owned by the Kroger Company. The green substance that caused
Robinson's slip and fall was on the floor between two produce bins.
Robinson claimed that the overhang of the produce bin obstructed her
view of the floor, and, therefore, she could not see the substance that
caused her fall. Based on this, Robinson brought a negligence action
against Kroger to recover for injuries caused by her fall.3
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Kroger based
on Robinson's failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety.4 The
court of appeals affirmed and agreed that Robinson had failed to exercise
ordinary care by neglecting to use her senses, namely her eyesight, to
avoid the hazard on the floor.5 The Supreme Court of Georgia granted
certiorari to determine "the proper standard for determining whether the

1. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
2. Id. at 748-49, 493 S.E.2d at 414. The Georgia Supreme Court also addressed the
"plain view" doctrine and the "distraction doctrine" in this opinion, but a discussion of those
issues is beyond the scope of this article. Id. at 742-43, 493 S.E.2d at 409-11 ("plain view"
doctrine); Id. at 744-46, 493 S.E.2d at 411-12 ("distraction doctrine").
3. Robinson v. Kroger, 222 Ga. App. 711, 711-12, 476 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1996).
4. Id. at 711, 476 S.E.2d at 30.
5. Id. at 714, 476 S.E.2d at 31.
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plaintiff in a 'slip and fall' premises liability case has exercised ordinary
6
care sufficient to prevail against a motion for summary judgment."
The supreme court reversed and held that (1) an invitee's failure to
exercise reasonable care is not established as a matter of law by her
failure to look at the area where she is walking; and (2) an invitee has
presented some evidence of the exercise of reasonable care when she
establishes that something in the control of the owner/occupier, of which
the owner or occupier knew or should have known, caused the invitee to
be distracted; and (3) that the plaintiff does not shoulder the evidentiary
burden to disprove negligence in a slip-and-fall case until the defendant
has produced
some evidence that the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary
7
care.

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In Alterman Foods v. Ligon,' the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed
the state of slip-and-fall law in Georgia in an attempt to curb the trend
of "drift[ing] toward a jury issue in every ... case."9 Plaintiff in
Alterman Foods slipped on defendant's floor while shopping on a rainy
day. Defendant introduced testimony establishing that no foreign
substance was on the floor where plaintiff had fallen, and further, that
the floors were cleaned weekly with a nonslip wax.'° ' The court of
appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of defendant on the grounds that a material question of fact existed on
whether an unreasonable danger was presented by the slippery floor."
In reversing the appellate court's decision, the supreme court
reiterated many basic tenets of premises liability law, including the
statutory principle 2 that an owner or occupier of land must exercise
ordinary care to keep the premises safe." The court, recognizing that
knowledge is the main basis for an owner/occupier's liability, stated that
recovery may be had in a slip-and-fall case "only when the perilous
instrumentality is known to the owner or occupant and not known to the
person injured .... ,"" In addition, the court noted that an invitee

6. 268 Ga. at 735, 493 S.E.2d at 405.
7. Id. at 748-49, 493 S.E.2d at 414.
8. 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
9. Id. at 621, 272 S.E.2d at 329.
10. Id. at 620-21, 272 S.E.2d at 328-29.
11. Id. at 621, 272 S.E.2d at 329.
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-401 (Harrison 1933) (currently codified at O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1
(1981)).
13. 246 Ga. at 622, 272 S.E.2d at 329.
14. Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Reid, 132 Ga. App. 136, 138, 207 S.E.2d 532,
534 (1980)).
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must exercise ordinary care to avoid hazards, and in doing so, the invitee
must utilize all senses in a reasonable manner to discover and avoid
hazards. 5
The court concluded that in order "to state a cause of action ... the
plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive
knowledge of the foreign substance and (2) that the plaintiff was without
knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the
defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance."'6
Because plaintiff in Alterman Foods failed to establish that defendant
had negligently maintained the premises, the appellate court's
reversal
7
of summary judgment in favor of defendant was in error.'
This new standard proved to be owner/occupier friendly because it
provided defendants with two prongs through which a plaintiff's claim
could be defeated at summary judgment: The defendant may defeat the
plaintiff's claim by either (1) establishing that the defendant lacked
actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard, or (2) proving either the
plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard that was at least equal or
superior to that of the defendant, or that the plaintiff should have had
knowledge in the exercise of ordinary care. 8 If the plaintiff failed to
carry either of the two burdens, summary judgment in favor of the
defendant was proper."
Initially, the majority of cases decided pursuant to Alterman Foods
were disposed of by summary judgment based on the first prong of the
test, namely the owner/occupier's lack of actual or constructive knowledge regarding the hazard.2" In a few cases, the court analyzed the
second prong, and determined summary judgment was appropriate
because the invitee admitted he had knowledge of the danger and had
voluntarily encountered it. 2 '
The Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores22
dramatically shifted the emphasis from obtaining summary judgment
based on the first prong of the Alterman Foods test to the second prong,

15. Id. at 623, 272 S.E.2d at 330.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 625-26, 272 S.E.2d at 332.
18. Id., 272 S.E.2d at 330.
19. Id. at 624-25, 272 S.E. at 331.
20. 268 Ga. at 736-37, 493 S.E.2d at 406 (citing Kenny v. M & M, 183 Ga. App. 225,
358 S.E.2d 641 (1987); DeGracia v. Huntingdon Assoc., 176 Ga. App. 495, 336 S.E.2d 602
(1985); Player v. Bassford, 172 Ga. App. 135, 322 S.E.2d 520 (1984)).
21. Id. (citing Lindsey v. J.H. Harvey Co., 213 Ga. App. 659,445 S.E.2d 810 (1994); Lea
v. American Home Equities, 210 Ga. App. 214, 435 S.E.2d.734 (1993); Bloch v. Herman's
Sporting Goods, 208 Ga. App. 280, 430 S.E.2d 86 (1993)).
22. 199 Ga. App. 808, 406 S.E.2d 234 (1991).
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an invitee's failure to use ordinary care for his personal safety. In WalMart plaintiff slipped on a clear substance while shopping in defendant's
store. Plaintiff testified that if she had been looking down she would
have seen the substance on the floor. In addition, plaintiff's shopping
companion testified that she saw the substance.2"
In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant, the court of appeals determined that plaintiff failed to
exercise ordinary care for her own safety as a matter of law.2 4 Plaintiff's admission that she would have seen the hazard if she had been
looking at the floor where it was located established that her knowledge
of the danger was at least equal to defendant's knowledge of the danger,
and therefore, summary judgment in favor of defendant was proper
under the second prong of the test established in Alterman Foods."
The holding in Wal-Mart broadened the second prong of the Alterman
Foods test to such a degree that it created an almost insurmountable
obstacle for a plaintiff to overcome to avoid summary judgment. The
holding imputed knowledge to the invitee because she would have seen
the hazard if she had been looking where she placed her foot. In
Colevins v. Federated Department Stores,28 the court took the holding
from Wal-Mart to the extreme and held that an invitee had failed to
exercise ordinary care even though the invitee testified he would not
have seen the hazard even if he had been looking directly at the area
where it was located.
The already formidable burden placed on slip-and-fall plaintiffs was
worsened by the Supreme Court of Georgia's holding in Lau's Corp. v.
Haskins.2 ' According to the court, "... the burden on the moving party
may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the ... record that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's
case. " 8 This placed the slip-and-fall plaintiff in the position of not only
having to establish the defendant's knowledge of the foreign substance
to avoid summary judgment, but also to prove that the plaintiff had
exercised reasonable care for her own safety.
The triple threat posed by the test in Alterman Foods as well as the
holdings in Wal-Mart and Lau's Corp. created a legal obstacle that few
plaintiffs could overcome. The Georgia Supreme Court addressed slipand-fall law in Alterman Foods specifically because these type of cases

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 810, 406 S.E.2d at 236.
Id.
Id.
213 Ga. App. 49, 52, 443 S.E.2d 871, 873-74 (1994).
261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).
Id. at 491, 405 S.E.2d at 474.
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were being overly litigated and too many were going before a jury. Since
Alterman Foods, and even more so since Wal-Mart and Lau's Corp., the
pendulum had swung to the other extreme with few slip-and-fall cases
making it past the summary judgment stage. By holding that an invitee
failed to exercise ordinary care when she should have seen a hazard, the
courts were in effect circumventing the superior knowledge requirement
and determining an invitee had acted negligently, an inherently factual
determination, as a matter of law. In addition, the slip-and-fall
plaintiffs not only had to establish that the owner/occupier had
knowledge of the hazard to avoid summary judgment, but the plaintiffs
had to prove they had exercised reasonable care as well. Based on this,
the supreme court determined that Robinson presented a much needed
opportunity to revisit the test in Alterman Foods.29
III.

THE RATIONALE OF THE COURT

The supreme court recognized that recent slip-and-fall cases had
hinged on the suspect determination that an invitee failed to use
ordinary care as a matter of law.3" Further, these decisions had
erroneously placed the emphasis on the actions of the invitee while
downplaying the statutory obligation placed on owner/occupiers to safely
maintain the premises.3 1 The court also took the opportunity to
address the near insurmountable burden placed on the slip-and-fall
plaintiff in order to avoid a motion for summary judgment.32
The court noted that "issues of negligence, contributory negligence,
and lack of ordinary care for one's own safety are not susceptible to
summary adjudication.., but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary
manner." " However, the court acknowledged that a trial court can
conclude that an invitee failed to exercise ordinary care when the
evidence is "plain, palpable, and undisputable."34 The court reiterated
the basic principle that when reasonable minds can differ on whether an
invitee has exercised reasonable care for her own safety, summary
adjudication is not warranted.35
The court was further concerned with the recent movement in slipand-fall case law that had de-emphasized the burden on the own-

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
S.E.2d

268 Ga. at 746, 493 S.E.2d at 412-13.
Id. at 739, 493 S.E.2d at 408.
Id. at 740, 493 S.E.2d at 408.
Id. at 746, 493 S.E.2d at 412-13.
Id. at 739, 493 S.E.2d at 408.
Id.
Id. at 740, 493 S.E.2d at 408 (citing Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, 158 Ga. App. 166, 279
342 (1981)).
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er/occupier and had placed a greater emphasis on the actions of the
invitee. 6 The court noted that the foundation of premises liability law,
as codified by O.C.G.A. section 51-3-1, rests on the failure of the
owner/occupier to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises safe
and not exposing invitees to unreasonable risk.3" The basis of premises
liability, according to the court, is that when an owner/occupier
encourages others to enter his property, he makes an implied representation that he has exercised reasonable care to make the premises safe.3"
An invitee is required to exercise ordinary care to maintain his own
safety and to use all senses to ascertain and avoid hazards. 39 Therefore, the court reasoned, an invitee "is not barred from recovery simply
because by extreme care on his part it would have been possible for him
to have discerned the articles negligently left in the aisles or passageways customarily used by the store's patrons at the merchant's tacit
invitation."40 The court noted that an invitee is bound to utilize a
"reasonable lookout," which is a fact-sensitive determination based on
the time and place of the accident, to avoid a hazard.4'
In light of the preceding arguments, the court reversed the appellate
court's decision affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant Kroger, citing that plaintiff had not failed to exercise ordinary
care for her safety as a matter of law.42 However, the court's inquiry

did not end there as it took the opportunity to analyze another
"troubling aspect" of modern slip-and-fall case law, namely the disproportionate
burden placed on plaintiffs in light of the decision in Lau's
43
Corp.

The court was concerned that since the holding in Lau's Corp. was
applied to the Alterman Foods test, a plaintiff in a slip-and-fall case was
required not only to actively prove that an owner/occupier had actual or

36. Id.
37. Id. The court recognized that an owner/occupier is not required to protect all people
from every possible danger, but only to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises
in a safe condition. Id.
38. Id. at 740-41, 493 S.E.2d at 409.
39. Id. at 741, 493 S.E.2d at 409.
40. Id. at 741-42, 493 S.E.2d at 409 (citing King Hardware Co. v. Teplis, 91 Ga. App.
13, 15, 84 S.E.2d 686, 687 (1954)).
41. Id. at 742, 493 S.E.2d at 409.
42. Id. at 743, 493 S.E.2d at 411 (This concluded the first division of the .Robinson
opinion, in which all Justices concurred. The court also addressed the "plain view" doctrine
in this division of the opinion. However, as noted earlier, a discussion of that doctrine is
not included in this article.)
43. Id. at 744, 493 S.E.2d at 411 (This began division two of the court's holding, in
which all Justices, except Justice Fletcher, concurred. The court also discussed the
"distraction doctrine" at this point in the opinion.)
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constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition, but also that he
exercised reasonable care for his own safety by pointing to evidence in
the record." Conversely, the defendant had no burden to produce any
evidence to disprove the plaintiff's case. "At the time Alterman Foods
was decided ...

a defendant moving for summary judgment had the

burden of producing evidence which negated at least one essential
element of the plaintiff's case."45 "Under Lau's Corp. [sic], the defendant proprietor has no burden whatsoever on summary judgment to
produce evidence to negate the plaintiff's theory of recovery."46
The court determined that the test set out in Alterman Foods had been
unfairly altered due to the changes in the standard for summary
judgment established in Lau's Corp.4 7 In light of this inequitable
burden, the court modified the second prong of the test established in
Alterman Foods.48 Thus an invitee, in order to withstand a summary
judgment, must still produce evidence that the owner/occupier knew or
should have known of the hazardous condition.4 9 However, under the
modified Alterman Foods test, the plaintiff need only come forward with
evidence tending to prove that he exercised reasonable care after the
defendant produces evidence that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by
the plaintiff's voluntary negligence or failure to exercise ordinary care
for his own safety.5"
Therefore, the evidentiary burden would require the defendant to
establish the plaintiff's negligence only after the plaintiff had established
that the defendant knew or should have known of the hazardous
condition. 5' Only then, the court concluded, would the plaintiff have to
come forward with evidence that established that he had exercised
ordinary care.52 The court noted that this balanced the burdens on the
respective parties in slip-and-fall actions and placed the normal burden,
that of establishing a defense to liability, on the owner/occupier.53

44. Id. at 746, 493 S.E.2d at 412-13.
45. Id., 493 S.E.2d at 413. This was accomplished by the defendant establishing either
a lack of knowledge of the hazard on his part, or by affirmatively proving that the plaintiff
had failed to exercise reasonable care to maintain his own safety. Id. at 747, 493 S.E.2d
at 413.
46. Id. at 747, 493 S.E.2d at 413 (citing Brown v. Amerson, 220 Ga. App. 318, 469
S.E.2d 723 (1996)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 747-48, 493 S.E.2d at 413.
50. Id. at 748, 493 S.E.2d at 413.
51. Id., 493 S.E.2d at 413-14.
52. Id., 493 S.E.2d at 414.
53. Id.
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IMPLICATIONS

The holding in Robinson represented a drastic and unexpected
departure from existing slip-and-fall case law. Following Robinson, not
one motion for summary judgment has been granted in favor of an
owner/occupier based on the failure of the invitee to exercise reasonable
care absent clear and palpable evidence that the invitee actually knew
of the danger.5 4 Therefore, the most obvious effect of the holding in
Robinson is that more cases have survived summary judgment.5
Ironically, the major controversy and misunderstanding surrounding
the Robinson holding does not relate to the second prong of the Alterman
Foods test, but instead concerns whether the burden for the purpose of
summary judgment has been altered for the first prong. The renewed
focus on the knowledge of the owner/occupier has created a split between
the Supreme Court of Georgia's holding in Robinson and the treatment
it has received from the Georgia Court of Appeals.
In Robinson the supreme court reaffirmed that "in order to recover for
injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove ...
that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard
....

,,s6 In essence this reaffirmed the holding in Lau's Corp., namely

that the moving party may prevail at summary judgment by pointing to
an absence of evidence in the record to support the nonmoving parties
case, as it related to the first prong of the Alterman Foods test.
However, in Kelley v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc.," one of the first
cases heard since the decision in Robinson, the court of appeals reversed
the grant of summary judgment based on the owner/occupier's constructive knowledge of the hazard. 8 The court reasoned that the owner/occupier had failed to pierce the pleadings of the invitee by establishing a reasonable inspection and cleaning procedure had been implemented and, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate.59 Justice
Andrews vigorously dissented, arguing that the owner/occupier had no
burden to establish that a reasonable inspection process was implemented and need only point to an absence of evidence in the record to support
the fact it had constructive knowledge."0 Justice Andrews contended
54. See Denham v. Young Men's Christian Assoc. & Youth Center of Thomasville, Inc.,
231 Ga. App. 197, 499 S.E.2d 94 (1998).
55. See West Lumber Co. v. Beck, 231 Ga. App. 46, 497 S.E.2d 647 (1998); Jones v.
Ingles Market, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 338, 498 S.E.2d 365 (1998).
56. 268 Ga. at 748-49, 493 S.E.2d at 414.
57. 230 Ga. App. 508, 496 S.E.2d 732 (1997).
58. Id. at 511, 496 S.E.2d at 736.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 517, 496 S.E.2d at 740.
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that the Robinson decision had left the first prong of the Alterman Foods
test untouched, so the court's apparent shifting of the burden in regard
to the
owner/occupier's actual or constructive knowledge was improp61
er.
Sharfuddin v.Drug Emporium, Inc.,6 2 which was heard just after
Kelley, gave the court another opportunity to apply the principles
established in Robinson. The court agreed that the invitee had failed to
establish either the actual or constructive knowledge of the owner/occupier regarding the danger and affirmed the grant of summary
judgment." The court reasoned that the decision in Robinson had left
the first prong of the Alterman Foods test untouched, and therefore,
summary judgment was still proper when the invitee failed to establish
either the actual or constructive knowledge of the owner/occupier.' In
a complete departure from Kelley, the court further rejected the invitee's
argument that the owner/occupier has the burden of establishing that an
inspection process was in operation, noting the cases that required this
of the owner/occupier were either decided prior to the elimination of the
burden by Lau's Corp. or erroneously relied on decisions decided before
Lau's Corp."5
The Sharfuddin opinion was also accompanied by a zealous dissent,
authored by Justice Eldridge and joined by Justice Blackburn, that
indicated the emerging split between the justices over the implications
of Robinson and foreshadowed how the court would rule in subsequent
opinions." Justice Eldridge argued that Robinson had reallocated the
burden for summary judgment in both the first and second prongs of the
Alterman Foods in an attempt to ameliorate the heavy burden that
invitee's previously had shouldered. 7
In the opinions that followed, the court of appeals repeatedly reversed
grants of summary judgment on appeal based on the owner/occupier's
failure to establish that reasonable inspection procedures were in place
and followed."8 The opinions, which were written by Justice Blackburn,
based the alteration of the first prong of the Alterman Food test on what
the court thought was the "clear thrust" of Robinson, "an exhortation to

61. Id. at 516, 496 S.E.2d at 740.
62. 230 Ga. App. 679, 498 S.E.2d 748 (1998).
63. Id. at 686, 498 S.E.2d at 754.

64. Id. at 684, 498 S.E.2d at 753.
65. Id. at 686, 498 S.E.2d at 754.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 687-88, 498 S.E.2d at 755.
68. See McCullogh v. Kroger Co., 231 Ga. App. 453, 498 S.E.2d 594 (1998); Straughter
v. J.H. Harvey Co., 232 Ga. App. 29, 500 S.E.2d 353 (1998); Hartley v. Macon Bacon Tune,
Inc., 234 Ga. App. 815, 507 S.E.2d 259 (1998).
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avoid creating impossible hurdles for slip and fall plaintiffs at the
summary judgment stage."6 9 The court reasoned that requiring an
absolute rule that an invitee must establish the amount of time a
substance had been on the floor, as was required to establish constructive knowledge prior to Robinson, ° created an almost impossible hurdle
for most invitees. 71 The court viewed this approach as contrary to the
purpose of Robinson, namely to "lighten the load" for an invitee at
summary judgment, and in essence, refused to adopt it. 72 This line of
reasoning has practically rendered the summary judgment standard as
established in Lau's Corp. obsolete as it applies to slip-and-fall cases.
The aforementioned line of cases was accompanied by scathing
dissents written by Justice Andrews.73
Justice Andrews's biggest
concern, consistent with his dissent in Kelley, was that the court has
misconstrued the holding in Robinson as applying to the first prong of
the Alterman Foods test and, in the process, changed the burden for
summary judgment as established in Lau's Corp. by requiring the
owner/occupier to produce evidence it complied with a reasonable
inspection procedure. 4
The supreme court's attempt to "regain balance in the allocation of the
burden of proof' in slip-and-fall cases has resulted in a possible overcorrection on the part of the court of appeals.75 The tension between
the holding in Robinson and subsequent appellate decisions, and
between existing appellate court decisions, has created an issue that
surely will have to be revisited by the supreme court. If the supreme
court affirms the application of Robinson in Kelley, and many of the
cases that followed, it will in effect abrogate Lau's Corp. as it applies to
slip-and-fall cases by requiring an owner/occupier to produce evidence it
complied with a reasonable inspection procedure. If the court establishes that the decision in Sharfuddin was a correct analysis of its decision
in Robinson, then summary judgment would be proper when the

69. 232 Ga. App. at 32, 500 S.E.2d at 356.
70. Id. Justice Andrews argued in his dissent that a plaintiff can show constructive
knowledge "either by showing the hazard had been there so long that the defendant should
have discovered it by reasonable inspection, or by showing that an employee of the
defendant was in the immediate area of the hazard and could have easily removed it." Id.
at 33, 500 S.E.2d at 357.
71. Id. at 32, 500 S.E.2d at 356.
72. Id. at 33, 500 S.E.2d at 357.
73. See 231 Ga. App. at 455, 498 S.E.2d at 596; 232 Ga. App. at 33, 500 S.E.2d at 357;
234 Ga. App. at 819, 507 S.E.2d at 262.
74. 234 Ga. App. at 824, 507 S.E.2d at 266.
75. 268 Ga. at 747, 493 S.E.2d at 413.
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owner/occupier can point to an absence of evidence in the record
regarding its knowledge of the hazard.
The holding in Robinson indeed leveled the playing field, but the
interpretation adopted by the majority of the cases decided by the
appellate court skewers it in favor of the invitee, creating the exact
problem that Alterman Foods was designed to address: over litigation
of slip-and-fall cases. Judging from the plain language in Robinson,
which reallocates the invitee's burden concerning the second prong only,
the supreme court will most likely stand by its analysis that Lau's Corp.
still applies to the first prong of the Alterman Foods test. However, the
only certainty is that the supreme court will have to revisit the holding
in Robinson and clarify its position as it relates to the first prong of the
Alterman Foods test.
MORGAN
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